Rent-seeking contests with independent private values by Ewerhart, Christian
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 490 
Rent-seeking contests with independent private 
values 
Christian Ewerhart 
June 2010 
 
 
Rent-seeking contests with independent private values
Christian Ewerharta
aUniversity of Zurich; postal address: Chair for Information Economics and
Contract Theory, Winterthurerstrasse 30, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland; e-mail:
christian.ewerhart@uzh.ch; phone: 41-44-6343733; fax: 41-44-6344978.
Abstract. We consider symmetric rent-seeking contests with independent
private valuations of the contest prize. For a two-parameter specication with
continuous types, we fully characterize the Bayesian equilibrium, and study
its basic properties. The willingness to waste is a hump-shaped function of
the private valuation, with the median type expending the highest share of
her valuation. A rst-order (second-order) stochastic increase in the common
type distribution raises (lowers) ex-ante expected e¤orts. However, neither
rst-order nor second-order stochastic dominance in valuations necessarily
leads to a rst-order stochastic dominance ranking in e¤orts. We also show
that, as uncertainty vanishes, the Bayesian equilibrium converges to the Nash
equilibrium of the model with complete information.
Keywords. Rent seeking; conict; independent private valuations; rst-
order stochastic dominance; mean-preserving spread.
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1. Introduction
In a classic rent-seeking contest, as proposed by Tullock (1980), agents ex-
pend resources to improve their relative position vis-à-vis others agents with
conicting interests. Such contests may, for instance, relate to lobbying,
political campaign, marketing, defense, or sports. In reality, incomplete in-
formation, for instance about the valuation of prizes, is a crucial feature of
such contests. However, early modeling has largely abstracted from this fea-
ture. Therefore, there is a growing interest to understand the implications
of asymmetric information for equilibrium behavior in rent-seeking contests.
A number of recent contributions have incorporated private information
into the basic set-up. Hurley and Shogren (1998a) consider a model with
one-sided private information. I.e., one agent is uncertain about the other
agents valuation of the contest prize. In this case, the uninformed agents
e¤ort becomes a risky input, which reduces her expected probability of win-
ning. Hurley and Shogren (1998b) allow for two-sided private information
and correlation. One agent has one of two possible values, the other agent
has one of three possible values. In general, this specication allows a nu-
merical solution only. The authors conclude that information is a key factor
inuencing e¤ort expended in a rent-seeking contest. Restricting attention
to a symmetric information structure, with two equally likely values for each
agent, Malueg and Yates (2004) fully characterize the Bayesian equilibrium,
and show that increased possibilities for ex-post lopsidedness lead to less ag-
gressive bidding. Fey (2008) considers a model with a uniform distribution
of marginal costs, and proves existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
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using Schauders xed-point theorem. Little is known about the case when
players valuations are drawn from di¤erent distributions (cf. Wärneryd,
2010).
In this paper, we consider symmetric rent-seeking contests in which agents
have private and independently drawn valuations of the contest prize. Stud-
ied is a Bayesian equilibrium, so that an agents optimal level of expenses
depends on her valuation of the contest prize as well as on the equilibrium
distribution of e¤ort levels chosen by the other agent. For continuous type
distributions, this problem is in general intractable. We will point out, how-
ever, that for a particular two-parameter specication with continuous types,
the equilibrium indeed allows a closed-form solution. Our main result fully
characterizes the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium for this specication.
The characterization obtained can be used to study various properties
and comparative statics of the Bayesian equilibrium. Three types of results
are derived. First, we show that the willingness to waste, i.e., the share of the
prize that an agent is expending for rent-seeking activities, is a hump-shaped
function of the agents valuation. Second, we study the consequences of
changing the distribution of types. We nd here that a rst-order stochastic
shift in the common type distribution unambiguously increases ex-ante ex-
pected e¤orts, while a mean-preserving spread in valuations unambiguously
lowers ex-ante expected e¤orts. However, a rst-order stochastic increase in
types does not necessarily lead to a rst-order stochastic increase in equilib-
rium expenses. Moreover, a second-order stochastic increase in types (i.e.,
a mean-preserving spread) never leads to a rst-order stochastic decrease
of bids in our specication. Finally, we show that when the type interval
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converges to a given valuation, the support of the equilibrium strategies con-
verges to the Nash equilibrium of the complete information game.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The model is introduced in
Section 2. Section 3 presents the two-parameter specication with continuous
types, and solves for the equilibrium. Properties and comparative statics of
the Bayesian equilibrium are studied in Section 4. Concluding remarks can
be found in Section 5. Appendix A replicates our comparative statics results
in the two-type specication. The proof of our main result can be found in
Appendix B.
2. Contests with independent private valuations
Two risk-neutral agents i = 1; 2 compete in a rent-seeking contest that allo-
cates a given prize. Valuations of the prize are random and independently
distributed. Denote by vi agent is valuation. Valuations are private infor-
mation, i.e., agent i = 1; 2 observes vi, yet not vj for j 6= i. The valuation
vi is drawn ex ante from a common interval [v; v], where 0 < v < v. The
density function associated with the distribution of vi is denoted by f(:), the
corresponding cumulative distribution function by F (:). Agents choose levels
of expenses simultaneously. We denote by xi  0 agent is level of expense.
The ex-post utility for an agent i with valuation vi, for expenses xi by agent
i, and expenses xj by agent j 6= i, is given by
ui(xi; xj; vi) = p(xi; xj)vi   Ci(xi), (1)
where p(xi; xj ) is agent is probability of winning (i.e., p(:; :) is the contest
success function), and Ci(xi) denotes agent is costs. We will refer to the
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game of incomplete information thereby dened as a contest with independent
private valuations.
Given a contest with independent private valuations, by a symmetric
Bayesian equilibrium, we mean a measurable rent-seeking strategy  : [v; v]!
R+ such that for i = 1; 2, and for all vi 2 [v; v], we have
(vi) 2 argmax
xi0
Z v
v
p(xi; (vj))vif(vj)dvj   Ci(xi). (2)
For strictly increasing cost functions one may, as usual, redene expenses
in terms of disutility, and assume without loss of generality that Ci(xi)  xi.
Moreover, while more general contest success functions can be studied, we
will focus in this paper on the lottery success function given by p(xi; xj) =
xi=(xi+xj) for xi+xj > 0, and by p(xi; xj) = 1=2 otherwise. We will impose
these two assumptions throughout the paper, and note that the optimization
problem in (2) is then well-dened.
While we will restrict attention to contests with private information about
valuations, one could equivalently have studied contests with private infor-
mation about costs (cf. Fey, 2008). Indeed, the equivalence follows directly
from dividing the objective function in (2) by vi > 0. However, for the
present purposes, the exposition simplies somewhat by considering private
information about valuations.
3. A two-parameter specication
This section deals with a particular specication of a contest with indepen-
dent private valuations. It has been conjectured by Fey (2008) that the
model with uniform cost types is not tractable. However, that conjecture
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leaves open the possibility that a tractable example could be found in other
cases. As we will show in this section, the model indeed allows a tractable
specication when one is willing to deviate from the uniform case.
To this end, we introduce the following distribution on a given interval
[v; v], for arbitrary parameters v > v > 0. For valuations v 2 [v; v], dene
the function
F (vjv; v) =
ln(
q
(v v)2
4
+ 2(v + v)v   v+v
2
)  ln(v)
ln(v)  ln(v) . (3)
It is immediate to see that F (:jv; v) is a cumulative distribution function.
Indeed, F (:jv; v) is nondecreasing and continuous. Moreover, F (vjv; v) = 0
and F (vjv; v) = 1. We may therefore assume that the distribution of agents
valuations is given by F (:jv; v). As mentioned before, the reason for studying
this particular distribution function is that it leads to a tractable description
of the Bayesian equilibrium. In the sequel, we often write F (:), dropping the
reference to the parameters v and v.
Figure 1 below illustrates the associated density f = F 0 for parameters
v = 8 and v = 24.
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Figure 1. Density of agentsvaluations
Having specied the distribution of private valuations, we may now charac-
terize the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Consider the contest with private valuations drawn indepen-
dently from the common distribution F (:jv; v), where v > v > 0. There exists
a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in this contest, in which agents choose the
strategy
(v) = f
p
A2 + v  Bg, (4)
where
A =
1
2
v   v
v + v
r
v + v
2
, (5)
B =
1
2
r
v + v
2
, and (6)
 =
1
ln(v=v)
v   v
v + v
r
v + v
2
. (7)
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In this equilibrium, all types expend a strictly positive e¤ort.
A proof of this result can be found in Appendix B.
See Figure 2 for an illustration of the equilibrium strategy.
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Figure 2. The Bayesian equilibrium strategy
4. Properties of the equilibrium
This section derives basic properties and comparative statics of the Bayesian
equilibrium identied in Proposition 1. We start by looking at the types
relative willingness to employ resources for ine¢ cient rent-seeking purposes.
Subsequently, we will study the consequences of stochastically changing the
underlying type distribution. The nal subsection contains a limit consider-
ation for vanishing uncertainty.
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4.1 Equilibrium e¤orts
In this subsection, we compare e¤ort levels across types. For this, we will
make use of the following concept. Given a symmetric Bayesian equilib-
rium in a rent-seeking contest, an agents willingness to waste (Hurley and
Shogren, 1998a) is dened as
(v) =
(v)
v
, (8)
where v is the agents valuation. Thus, (v) is the share of the prize that an
agent with valuation v is willing to sacrice in the contest.
Let us briey report on what is known about the willingness to waste. Un-
der complete information, the willingness to waste is identical across agents
(cf. Hurley and Shogren, 1998b). With two-sided asymmetric information
and two equally likely types, the willingness to waste is identical across types
as a consequence of the proportionality of equilibrium bids (cf. Malueg and
Yates, 2004). With continuous types, the numerical description of the equi-
librium strategy (cf. Fey, 2008) suggests that the willingness to waste does
not vary very much with the type.
We will show now that in our specication, the willingness to waste is a
hump-shaped function of v, with the median type being the most wasteful.
The rst part of this claim follows from di¤erentiating (v) with respect to
v. Indeed,
@
@v
=

2v2
p
A2 + v

 2A2   v + 2B
p
A2 + v

. (9)
Hence, @=@v < 0 if and only if
(2A2 + v)2
A2 + v
> 4B2. (10)
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After some re-arranging, this inequality reads
v2
A2 + v
> 4(B2   A2). (11)
Note now that the term on the left-hand side is strictly increasing in v.
Therefore, the willingness to waste is indeed hump-shaped (cf. Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Willingness to waste
As the gure suggests, the willingness to waste for the lowest and the highest
valuations is identical. Indeed, using Proposition 1, it is easy to check that
(v) = (v) =
1
2 ln(v=v)
v   v
v + v
. (12)
Next we show that the willingness to waste is highest for the median type.
The median of the distribution (3) can be found by solving F (vjv; v) = 1=2
for v = vM . A straightforward calculation shows that the median type is
given by
vM =
vv
v + v
+
p
vv
2
. (13)
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For instance, for the parameter values used above, vM = 12:92. To see
that vM indeed maximizes the willingness to waste, one simply checks the
rst-order condition. As illustrated in Figure 3, the willingness to waste is
increasing (decreasing) in the private valuation of the prize for types below
(above) the median type.
Intuitively, the hump-shape of (:) makes perfect sense. More extreme
types perceive the contest as more lopsided, which reduces the willingness to
waste compared to more central types.
4.2 Comparative statics
In this subsection, we use Proposition 1 to study the comparative statics of
the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in the rent-seeking contest. In partic-
ular, we are interested to better understand what happens in response to a
generally higher level of valuations or in response to a more dispersed type
distribution. We have therefore studied (numerically) the consequences of
changing the parameters of our specication to reect a rst-order or second-
order stochastic shift in the type distribution. The main steps and results of
our extensive calculations are reported upon below.
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Figure 4. First-order stochastic dominance between type distributions...
First-order stochastic dominance. It is natural to conjecture that increases
in either v or v correspond to rst-order stochastic shifts in the type distri-
bution. Numerical tests show that this is indeed the case. We will therefore
analyze how the distribution of equilibrium e¤orts depends on the parameters
of our specication.
This requires some preparation. The distribution of equilibrium e¤orts
has the distribution function
G(xjv; v)  F ( 1(x)jv; v) =
lnf2xv+v
v v ln(v=v)g   ln(v)
ln(v)  ln(v) , (14)
where  1(:) denotes the inverse function associated with the strictly increas-
ing and continuous strategy (:). Instead of studying directly the impact of
a change of parameters on G(:jv; v), it turns out to be easier to consider the
-percentile x = x(v; v) of that distribution, dened as the unique solution
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of the equation G(xjv; v) = . A straightforward calculation delivers
x(v; v) =
vv1 
2 ln(v=v)
v   v
v + v
, (15)
which is quite useful for the subsequent analysis.
We may come now to the comparative statics exercises announced above.
It turns out that an increase in v does not cause bids to increase stochastically.
To see this, set v = 1 for convenience. Then
x(1; v) =
v
2 ln(v)
v   1
v + 1
. (16)
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Figure 5. ...does not necessarily imply a rst-order stochastic increase of
equilibrium e¤orts.
Numerical calculations show that x(1; v) is decreasing in v for small ,
and increasing in v for large . See Figure 5 for illustration. This makes sense
intuitively because stakes are getting higher for stronger types, while weaker
types face even more an uphill battle. The intuitive reason for stochastic
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monotonicity to fail here is therefore that lower types become discouraged
through the higher likelihood of meeting a stronger opponent.
An increase in v, however, provokes a rst-order stochastic increase in the
distribution of equilibrium e¤orts. To see this, note that a simultaneous and
proportional increase of v and v by some factor  > 0 scales up equilibrium
strategies by . Therefore, to study comparative statics with respect to v,
we may normalize v to one. But
x(v; 1) =   v
1 
2 ln(v)
1  v
1 + v
. (17)
Numerical tests verify that this expression is increasing in v for any  2
[0; 1]. Thus, if the lower boundary of the support interval is lifted, all types
increase e¤ort. This is intuitive since uncertainty is reduced and all valuations
increase.
In sum, we have shown that a rst-order stochastic increase in the type
distribution may, but need not cause a corresponding rst-order stochastic
increase in the bid distribution.
Next, we look at the ex ante expected level of expenses of an agent. A
straightforward calculation using Proposition 1 deliversZ v
v
(v)f(v)dv =
(v   v)2
2(v + v) ln(v=v)2
. (18)
It turns out that an increase in v raises the expected level of expenses. This
can be seen through a numerical test after normalizing v = 1, as above.
Also an increase in v increases the expected level of expenses. Indeed, this
follows immediately from the fact that the distribution of equilibrium e¤orts
increases stochastically in v. Thus, a rst-order stochastic increase in the
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type distribution unambiguously raises average e¤orts in our specication.1
Second-order stochastic dominance. It is useful to look at an example.
Figure 6 depicts distribution functions F (:j8; 24) and F (:ja; 30), where the
parameter a = 6:23 has been determined via a numerical integration in such a
way that both distributions have the same mean. In addition to the equality
of the means, second-order stochastic dominance (cf. Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1970) requires that Z v0
0
F (vja; 30)dv 
Z v0
0
F (vj8; 24)dv (19)
for any v0  0. These inequalities have been checked numerically.2
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Figure 6. Similarly, second-order stochastic dominance in the type
distribution...
1Maybe interestingly, these predictions for the continuous specication can be repli-
cated in the two-type specication studied, e.g., by Malueg and Yates (2004). I.e., also
with two types, a rst-order stochastic increase in the type distribution raises average ef-
fort, but need not necessarily lead to a rst-order stochastic dominance in the distribution
of e¤orts. This is shown formally in Appendix A.
2Numerical integrations have been calculated using 1000 grid points in an MS Excel
spreadsheet.
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We found that expected equilibrium expenses are declining when types are
subject to a shift in second-order stochastic dominance.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of equilibrium expenses for our two ex-
ample distributions. Here, the increase in dispersion of types causes the
support interval of equilibrium bids to spread out. In particular, there is no
rst-order stochastic shift to the level of expenses. Intuitively, this is because
a more dispersed type distribution entails additional, aggressive types with
very high valuations.3
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Figure 7. ...does not cause a rst-order stochastic lowering in bids.
4.3 Diminishing uncertainty
Finally, we remark that the support of the Bayesian equilibrium strategy,
as uncertainty vanishes, shrinks down to the equilibrium level of expenses
3Also the results related to second-order stochastic dominance can be replicated in the
two-type specication. See Appendix A.
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of the complete-information limit game. To see this reected in the formal
framework, note that as v; v ! V , we have
lim
v;v!V
v>v
v   v
ln(v)  ln(v) = V . (20)
Hence, from Proposition 1, the limit of
(V ) = f
p
A2 + V  Bg (21)
is simply x = V=4, which is the Nash equilibrium level of expenses in the
symmetric model with complete information. Thus, the specication with
complete information can be seen as a limit of continuous specications with
incomplete information.
5. Conclusion
The present paper has continued the study of contests with two-sided in-
complete information. We have introduced a two-parameter specication of
the symmetric lottery contest with continuous types and independent private
valuations. Our main result fully characterizes the Bayesian equilibrium for
this specication. We have used our result to derive various structural predic-
tions related to the willingness-to-waste, stochastic dominance relationships,
and vanishing uncertainty. Of course, there is no guarantee that all of these
predictions can be taken for granted in the most general settings. However,
one can speculate that some of them, such as the e¤ect of rst-order and
second-order stochastic dominance on expected expenses, might indeed be
valid under more general circumstances.
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Appendix A: Stochastic dominance in the two-type specication
The purpose of this appendix is it to outline the implications of rst-order
and second-order stochastic dominance shifts in the two-type specication
studied by Malueg and Yates (2004) and others. More specically, we will
show that our comparative statics results for the continuous specication can
be replicated in the two-type specication.
For this, consider a symmetric lottery contest with two equally likely,
independently drawn type realizations vL and vH . Assume vH > vL > 0. It
is well-known that this contest has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in which
the willingness to waste is identical across types and equal to
 =
1
8
+
vLvH
2(vL + vH)2
: (22)
A rst-order stochastic increase of the type distribution corresponds to a
simultaneous increase in both vL and vH . We claim that a rst-order stochas-
tic increase in types causes expected equilibrium e¤ort to increase, whereas
a rst-order stochastic increase in e¤orts is not a necessary consequence. To
see this, note that expected equilibrium e¤ort is
E[x] =

2
(vL + vH) =
vL + vH
16
+
vLvH
4(vL + vH)
. (23)
It is not di¢ cult to check that this expression is increasing in both vL and vH ,
proving the rst claim. To see that a rst-order stochastic increase in e¤orts
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need not obtain, look at an increase of vH only. The contest becomes then
more lopsided, and  decreases. Hence, the equilibrium level of expenses for
the low type, xL = vL, is declining.
To investigate the consequence of a second-order stochastic increase of
the type distribution, write  = (vH + vL)=2 and  = (vH   vl)=2. We obtain
equilibrium e¤orts
xL =
1
8
(2  
2
2
)(  ) (24)
xH =
1
8
(2  
2
2
)(+ ) (25)
Expected equilibrium e¤ort is consequently given by
E[x] =

8
(2  
2
2
). (26)
A mean-preserving spread is now tantamount to increasing . It is therefore
immediate from (26) that the expected equilibrium e¤ort is declining when
the type distribution undergoes a second-order stochastic dominance shift.
We claim that a rst-order stochastic decline in bids, however, does not
occur as a consequence of a mean-preserving spread in the type distribution.
The reason for this to happen is that the high type will always increase her
equilibrium e¤ort. To see this formally, note that
@xH
@
=
1
4
(1  

) > 0. (27)
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
This Appendix contains the proof of the equilibrium characterization in the
continuous case. We will check the rst-order condition for an interior max-
imum, and subsequently verify that a boundary solution is not feasible.
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Assume that agent j adheres to the candidate equilibrium strategy (:),
and that agent is type realizes to vi. Then the rst-order condition corre-
sponding to the agents optimization problem readsZ v
v
(vj)vi
(xi + (vj))2
dF (vjjv; v) = 1. (28)
Using the explicit expression for agent js strategy
(vj) = f
p
A2 + vj  Bg, (29)
as well as the density of agent js value distribution
f(vjjv; v) = 1
2 ln(v=v)
p
A2 + vjf
p
A2 + vj  Bg
, (30)
the rst-order condition can be re-written asZ v
v
1
(xi + jf
q
A2j + vj  Bjg)2
jdvj
2
q
A2j + vj
=
ln(v=v)
vi
. (31)
The integral is solved by the substitution
Z = xi + jf
q
A2j + vj  Bjg. (32)
This yields
1
xi + f
p
A2 + v  Bg  
1
xi + f
p
A2 + v  Bg =
ln(v=v)
vi
. (33)
Using
v = 4B(B   A), (34)
v = 4B(B + A), (35)
we obtain
1
xi + (B   A)  
1
xi + (B + A)
=
ln(v=v)
vi
. (36)
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Multiplying through, one arrives at a quadratic equation characterizing the
optimal level of expenses for agent i:
0 = x2i + 2xiB + 
2(B2   A2)  2A
ln(v=v)
vi (37)
Applying the standard formula for quadratic equations yields
xi =  B +
s
2A2 +
2A
ln(v=v)
vi, (38)
where one solution drops out due to the nonnegativity requirement on xi.
Comparing this with the hypothesized equilibrium choice
xi = f B +
p
A2 + vig (39)
for agent i shows that it satises the rst-order condition. It is straightfor-
ward to verify that agent is problem is strictly concave. Indeed,
( 2)
Z v
v
(vj)
(xi + (vj))3
vif(vj)dvj < 0. (40)
Hence, the solution to the rst-order condition is indeed the only solution.
This proves the rst assertion. To see that all types invest a positive amount
for rent-seeking purposes, one plugs the explicit expressions (5) and (6) into
(4) to obtain
(v) =
v
v + v
r
v + v
2
> 0. (41)

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